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Notes
REDEFINING A CULPABLE MENTAL STATE FOR NON-
TRIGGERMEN FACING THE DEATH PENALTY
Tison v. Arizona
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 30, 1978, three brothers, Donald, Ricky, and Raymond Ti-
son, entered an Arizona prison carrying an ice-chest filled with weapons
which they gave to their inmate father Gary Tison and another pris-
oner.1 After escaping from the prison without firing a shot, the two
fugitives robbed and brutally murdered a family of four while the Tison
brothers stood by watching.2 When their flight was finally ended by a
police roadblock, Raymond and Ricky Tison were apprehended and
later convicted of felony murder for their participation in the escape and
other crimes which preceded their father's lethal acts. 3 Both brothers
were sentenced to death. 4
Twenty-one states, including Arizona, allow trial courts, under cer-
tain circumstances, to impose the death penalty on a defendant found
guilty of felony murder even though he or she had no intent to kill. 5
1. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1678 (1987). For a further discussion
of the facts of Tison, see infra notes 72-95 and accompanying text.
2. 107 S. Ct. at 1679.
3. Id. At the time of the Tisons' convictions, Arizona's felony murder law
provided that a defendant whose co-felon commits a killing during the course of
a robbery or kidnapping was guilty of capital murder. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (1956) (repealed 1978)). The law was later recodified to
include killings committed during escapes and in connection with several sex
and drug offenses. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(2), (B) (1978 &
Supp. 1987).
The Tisons were also charged with the murders, though not with capital
murder, under Arizona's accomplice liability statute. 107 S. Ct. at 1679-80 (cit-
ing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-139 (1956) (repealed 1978)). Generally speak-
ing, accomplices are liable for the crimes of another if they give assistance or
encouragement to that other for the purpose of bringing about the crime. W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw § 6.7, at 576-86 (2d ed. 1986).
4. 107 S. Ct. at 1679-80. Prior to the Tison brothers' convictions, Arizona's
death penalty statute was revised to meet the new standards of federal constitu-
tional law set forth in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). For a discussion
of Furman, see infra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
5. Four states authorize the death penalty for felony murderers who display
a mental state of recklessness or extreme indifference to human life. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-150(l)(a) (1977 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 636(a)(2),
(b) (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(l)(b) (1984); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38,
9-1(a)(3), 9-1 (b)(6), 9-1(g) (1987). Onejurisdiction authorizes the death penalty
where the felony murderer is a substantial participant in the underlying crime.
(367)
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The felony murder doctrine operates to make felons liable for most
homicides occurring during the course of a felony, regardless of
whether the defendant actually killed or intended to kill the victim. 6 Be-
cause the felony murder doctrine does not require the normal standard
of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" to be met for every material ele-
ment of an offense, including mental state, 7 it has been highly criticized
and modified in some states to limit its more objectionable effects. 8
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(4) (1985). Six states authorize the death pen-
alty for murder but take the defendant's minor participation in the felony into
account as a mitigating factor. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(3) (1978 &
Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(d) (1978 & Supp. 1985); IND.
CODE § 35-50-2-9(c)(4) (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(6) (1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(e) (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(4)
(1983). Six states authorize the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter. See
CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 189, 190.2(a)(17) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT.
§§ 782.04(1)(a), 775.082(l), 921.141(5)(d) (1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-1(a),
17-10-30(b)(2) (1984 & 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10, 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-202(a) (1982);
WYO. STAT. §§ 6-2-101, 6-2-102(h)(iv) (1983). Three states authorize the death
penalty for felony murder involving some additional aggravating circumstance,
excluding an intent to kill. See IDAHO CODE § 19-251 5 (g) (1987); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, §§ 701.7(B), 701.9(A), 701.10-701.12 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-27A-1 (1987).
6. LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 3, § 7.5, at 622-37. The felony murder doc-
trine has its roots in English common law which held that one who caused the
death of another during the commission or attempted commission of a crime
was guilty of murder. Id. at 622. Today, two primary concepts are offered to
justify the rule's existence: (1) that a felon's intent to commit a felony is trans-
ferable to any homicide which results from the felonious act; (2) that felony mur-
der is itself a distinct form of homicide which imposes strict liability on those
felons whose acts result in the death of another. Id. at 625-32. But see Roth &
Sundby, The Felony Murder Rule.- A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 446, 449-60 (1985) (rejecting both justifications and arguing for aboli-
tion of felony murder doctrine).
7. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged").
8. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 3, § 7.5(b)-(g), at 623-39. Many states
require that the felony serving as the basis for the felony murder conviction
must be in some way dangerous to human life. Id. at 623. Usually, the specific
crimes which provide that basis (common examples include rape, robbery, kid-
napping, arson and burglary) are listed in the state's felony murder statute. Id.
at 625. For a survey of various state felony murder laws and their different re-
strictions, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Despite some criticism of the doctrine, only three states have eliminated the
felony murder rule. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 (1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507.020 (1984); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W. 2d 304 (1980).
Critics vigorously attack the doctrine on the ground that it circumvents the nor-
mal requirement that mental state must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to
obtain conviction. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES, Pt. II, at 37-39 Comment to § 210.2 (1980) (recommending ab-
olition of felony murder rule except where defendant's conduct demonstrates
reckless indifference to value of human life); G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1978) (denouncing felony murder rule as "fictitious" and viola-
tive of equal protection clause and sixth amendment); Roth & Sundby, supra
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When a state imposes the death penalty on a defendant convicted of
felony murder, the controversy surrounding the felony murder doctrine
intensifies .9
Against the backdrop of the Tison brothers' convictions, the United
States Supreme Court recently considered the problem of imposing the
death penalty on felony murderers in Tison v. Arizona. 10 Since neither
brother killed nor specifically intended to kill, their case presented the
difficult question of what criteria, if any, must be met regarding a non-
triggerman's" mental state before a court can constitutionally take his
or her life. 12 With its decision in Tison, the Supreme Court has effec-
tively established "reckless disregard for human life" as the minimum
culpable mental state to warrant imposition of the death penalty on non-
triggermen who were major participants in a felony during the course of
which a killing took place.13
This Note will first examine significant death penalty and felony
murder decisions of the past fifteen years to set up an appropriate
framework within which to analyze the Tison case. The Note will then
focus on Tison, emphasizing its importance in relation to other recent
Supreme Court opinions addressing the death penalty. Finally, this
Note will discuss why the Court seems committed to preserving capital
punishment for some felony murderers even without a finding of intent
to kill and will offer, in light of the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Cabana v. Bullock, 14 a critique of the present situation in
which a felony murderer can be sentenced to death without a jury ever
making a specific finding regarding his or her mental state.
note 6, at 456 (assailing doctrine as "mens rea-imposing mechanism") (quoting
Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV., 50,
61 (1956)).
9. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty for Felony
Murder, 15 Hous. L. REV. 356, 385-86 (1978) ("[t]he objective indicia of a pun-
ishment's consistency with public standards of decency, acceptance by legisla-
tures and juries, point toward rejection of the death penalty for non-triggermen,
whose involvement in the murder is based on vicarious homicidal liability").
10. 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987).
11. Throughout this Note, "non-triggermen" will be used to denote felony
murder defendants. This name is used by both the Supreme Court and com-
mentators in discussing the felony murderer who does not kill, attempt to kill or
intend to kill. See, e.g., Comment, Intent After Enmund v. Florida: Not just Another
Aggravating Circumstance, 65 B.U.L. REV. 809 (1985); Note, Imposing the Death Sen-
tencefor Felony Murder on a Non-Triggerman, 37 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1985); Case-
note, Eighth Amendment-The Death Penalty and Vicarious Felony Murder: Non-
Triggermen May Not be Executed Absent a Finding of Intent to Kill, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1553 (1982).
12. 107 S. Ct. at 1672.
13. Id. at 1688. By setting this standard, the Court altered what many crit-
ics thought was an absolute "intent to kill" requirement set forth in Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). For a discussion of Enmund and its pre-Tison impli-
cations, see infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
14. 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
1988] NOTE 369
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The United States Supreme Court's Consideration of Major Constitutional
Attacks on the Death Penalty
1. Curtailing Unchecked Discretion in the Capital Sentencing Process:
Furman v. Georgia
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment in Furman v. Georgia.' 5 Although the
Furman Court did not find that infliction of the death penalty per se vio-
lates the eighth and fourteenth amendments' ban on cruel and unusual
punishment,' 6 it did hold that the death penalty could not be imposed
on the petitioners in that case. 17 In a per curiam decision representing
the conclusions of five justices, the Furman court invalidated all state
death penalty statutes which gave the finder of fact authority to decide in
one proceeding both whether a defendant was guilty or innocent and
whether he should be sentenced to death.' 8
All members of Furman's concurring majority filed separate opin-
ions. Justices Brennan and Marshall each found that the death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, thereby violating the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. 19 Justices Douglas, White, and Stewart,
while agreeing that the statutes in question imposed systems of cruel
and unusual punishment, refused to condemn the penalty outright and
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment states simply that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." Id. (emphasis added). The fourteenth amendment
operates to make the eighth amendment applicable to the states by providing
that no state can "deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." Id. amend. XIV. For a discussion of the interaction between
these two amendments within the criminal law context, see S. KADISH, S.
SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 17-19 (4th ed.
1983).
17. 408 U.S. at 239-40. In Furman, two petitioners were sentenced to
death; one for murder, the other for rape in accordance with Georgia law. Id. at
240. A third was sentenced to die for rape under Texas law. Id. All three peti-
tioners were sentenced by juries who had statutory authority to decide whether
or not to impose the death penalty at the same time they determined the defend-
ant's innocence or guilt. Id. The Court held that to impose the death penalty
under these circumstances would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 239-40.
18. Id. The per curiam decision constitutes a single paragraph in which the
Court simply held that the death penalty, when administered under schemes like
that of Georgia and Texas, violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments' ban
on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 240. Each judge filed a separate con-
curring or dissenting opinion.
19. Id. at 257 (Brennan,J., concurring) (describing death penalty as "fatally
offensive to human dignity" and therefore contrary to requirements of eighth
and fourteenth amendments), 306 (Marshall, J., concurring) (eighth and four-
teenth amendments cannot tolerate imposition of death penalty since it is so
wantonly and freakishly imposed).
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directed their criticism to statutes which gave the judge or jury unlimited
discretion to impose death on capital defendants.20
Ultimately this problem of uncontrolled discretion in capital sen-
tencing survived as the key to Furman.2 1 Because almost every state al-
lowing capital punishment had statutes similar to Georgia's at the time
of Furman, legislators quickly set to work to bring their newly invalidated
laws into line with the Court's holding. Generally, two types of revised
statutes emerged. The first type of statute, which imposed mandatory
death sentences for particular crimes, was quickly invalidated by the
Court.2 2 The second type provided the sentencer with "guided discre-
tion" by codifying the aggravating circumstances which if found, might
20. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discretionary statutes are unconsti-
tutional in their operation and their sentences were pregnant with discrimina-
tion-an idea not to be tolerated under Equal Protection), 306 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (denouncing statute's wanton and freakish imposition of death pen-
alty), 310 (White, J., concurring) (criticizing delegation of sentencing authority
to jury which is then free to refuse to impose death penalty despite circum-
stances of crime).
21. The problem of unchecked sentencing discretion remains a pivotal
point for states assessing the constitutionality of their death penalty statutes.
See, e.g., State v. Wright, 196 N.J. Super. 516, 526-27, 483 A.2d 436, 441 (Law.
Div. 1984) (interpretation of New Jersey's guided discretion death penalty stat-
ute as applying only to defendants who pass threshold culpability inquiry "satis-
fies the Furman dictate"); State v. Price, 195 NJ. Super. 285, 293-94, 478 A.2d
1249, 1253 (Law Div. 1984) (specificity and objective standards of New Jersey
death penalty statute make it a "facially constitutional sentencing scheme");
State v. Bass, 189 NJ. Super. 445, 451-52, 460 A.2d 214, 217-18 (Law Div.
1983) (in adopting language of Georgia's revised death penalty statute, New
Jersey legislature was aware of Supreme Court's concerns with vague sentencing
statutes); People v. Smith, 63 N.Y. 2d 41, 479 N.Y.S. 2d 706, 725, 468 N.E. 2d
879, 898 (construction allowing consideration of mitigating circumstances
within statute fails to save New York death penalty statute's mandatory death
penalty for second-time murderers), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1984), rehearing
denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 328, 513
A.2d 373, 387-88 (1986) ("challenging of considerations of mercy and leniency
into the scheme of aggravating and mitigating circumstances [of the Penn-
sylvania death penalty statute] is consistent with the mandate of Furman"), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987); Commonwealth v. Cross, 508 Pa. 322, 334-36, 496
A.2d 1144, 1150-52 (1985) (list of mitigating circumstances plus allowance for
defendant to go beyond and offer any evidence of mitigation contributes to con-
stitutionality of Pennsylvania death penalty statute).
22. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (invalidating Ohio death
penalty statute which imposed mandatory death penalty on defendants guilty of
aggravated murder unless sentencing judge finds one of three mitigating fac-
tors); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating mandatory death
sentences for defendants who murder policemen); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating mandatory death sentence for first degree
murderers). Lockett and Woodson both involved defendants convicted of felony
murder and sentenced to death for killings committed by another. Lockett, 438 at
590-91; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 283-84. Though the Court did not address the
constitutionality of the death penalty under these circumstances in either case,
the Lockett Court implied that insufficient proof as to the defendant's mental
state would be relevant as a mitigating factor. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
NOTE
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justify application of the death penalty. 23 This second type was sanc-
23. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1975) (repealed 1982). Georgia's
revised death penalty statute was typical of the post-Furman guided discretion
statutes:
(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the offenses of aircraft
hijacking or treason, in any case.
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may
be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his in-
structions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or
aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the
following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported
by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping
was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capi-
tal felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has
a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping
was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of
another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder
was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of
burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnap-
ping knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in
a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or
another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of mon-
etary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district
attorney or solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or
because of the exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or
committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it in-
volved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace of-
ficer, corrections employee or fireman while engaged in the perform-
ance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who
has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of law-
ful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding inter-
fering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful
confinement, of himself or another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to
be warranted by the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to
the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict be a recommenda-
tion of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the
jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found be-
yond a reasonable doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make such
designation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at
least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in sec-
tion 27-2534.1 (b) is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
Id.
This statute was affirmed by the Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
372
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tioned by the Court and quickly became the norm for many state death
penalty statutes. 2
4
2. Affirming the "Guided Discretion" Model for Capital Sentencing through
Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis: Gregg v. Georgia
In 1976, the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia 2 5 affirmed
Georgia's "guided discretion" death penalty statute and provided im-
portant direction to states in the wake of Furman's ambiguous holding.
2 6
After framing the initial issue in the case as whether "the punishment of
death for the crime of murder is, under all circumstances, 'cruel and
unusual' [punishment] in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments," 2 7 the plurality concluded that "the punishment of death
does not invariably violate the constitution. ' 28 Specifically rejecting the
petitioner's claim that the death penalty violated his rights under the
eighth amendment, the Court applied an imprecise "proportionality"
analysis comparing the ultimate harshness of the death penalty to the
seriousness of the petitioner's crime. 2 9 Prior to Gregg, the Court had
only rarely considered the proportionality question, preferring instead
to defer to the judgment of state legislators regarding which punish-
ments were appropriate for particular crimes. 30
(1976). The Georgia Code has since been revised and renumbered. The rele-
vant section is now at § 17-10-30 (1982).
24. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (affirming constitution-
ality of statute requiring judge or jury to find at least one of ten aggravating
circumstances before returning death sentence, allowing jury to make binding
recommendation of mercy regardless of aggravating circumstances, and provid-
ing for automatic appeal); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (affirming con-
stitutionality of statute requiring judge to weigh eight aggravating circumstances
against seven mitigating circumstances and providing automatic appeal); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (affirming constitutionality of statute requiring
finding of aggravating circumstances and allowing defendant to assert any miti-
gating circumstances).
25. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the jury convicted the defendant on two
counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. Id. at 160. In a separate
penalty hearing provided for in Georgia's amended (post-Furman) statute, the
jury found two statutory aggravating factors, no mitigating factors, and thus sen-
tenced the defendant to death. Id. at 161;see GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101 (1972),
26-1902 (1972) (repealed 1982). On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court va-
cated the sentence with regard to the robbery conviction, but upheld imposition
of the death penalty for the murder convictions. Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117,
210 S.E. 659 (1974).
26. For a discussion of state difficulties with the Furman holding, see supra
notes 22-23 and accompanying text. See also Gross, Race and Death: The Judicial
Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAvIs L. REV.
1275 (1985).
27. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168.
28. Id. at 187.
29. Id.
30. See D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 400-02 (1976) (listing
punishments which have not been invalidated as excessive); Note, The Effective-
ness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment 36
7
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Addressing the crime of murder, the Court noted three reasons3 l
why contemporary society accepts the death penalty as an appropriate
punishment for murder: (1) the death penalty for murderers has a long
history of acceptance in the United States and Great Britain;3 2 (2) 35
states enacted new death penalty statutes after Furman;33 and (3) the
death penalty accomplishes society's goals of deterrence and retribu-
tion.3 4 The significance of the proportionality analysis and of these fac-
N.Y.U.L. REV. 846, 852 (1961) (documenting general court tendency to avoid
invalidating sentences as excessive); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910) (sentence of 15 years hard labor, constant enchainment, permanent
loss of property rights and continual surveillance for life, disproportionate to
crime of falsifying official record).
31. For a discussion of these reasons within a general discussion of the
eighth amendment, see LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 3, § 2.14, at 178.
32. 428 U.S. at 176-78 (citing acceptance of capital punishment by framers
of Constitution as well as nearly two centuries of acceptance of capital punish-
ment for crime of murder).
33. Id. at 179-80. For further discussion of legislative attitudes and their
effect on American death penalty jurisprudence after Gregg, see infra notes 44,
58, 101 and accompanying text.
34. 428 U.S. at 183. The opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens
discusses the retribution justification as follows:
In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral out-
rage at particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappeal-
ing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens
to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their
wrongs. "The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves
an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed
by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwill-
ing or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
'deserve', then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigi-
lante justice, and lynch law."
"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law," but neither is it a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent with
our respect for the dignity of men. Indeed, the decision that capital
punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an ex-
pression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so
grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be
the penalty of death.
Id. at 183-84 (citations and footnotes omitted).
In the same opinion the Justices discussed the deterrent principle and its
operation in the death penalty debate:
Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may
not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties,
there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting
this view. We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers,
such as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has little
or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death penalty undoubt-
edly is a significant deterrent. There are carefully contemplated
murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible penalty of death
may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act.
And there are some categories of murder, such as murder by a life pris-
oner, where other sanctions may not be adequate.
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a com-
374
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tors within that analysis would be developed in ensuring death penalty
cases. For its purposes, however, the Gregg Court was content to con-
clude that the death penalty was not a disproportionate penalty to im-
pose on someone who had intentionally taken the life of another.
3 5
The Court also examined the Georgia statute itself to determine
whether its capital sentencing provisions violated the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. 36 The Georgia statute provided the following new
sentencing procedures: (1) a required jury finding of one of ten aggra-
vating factors before a defendant could receive a death sentence; (2) an
unconditional right of the jury to recommend mercy without regard for
aggravating circumstances; and (3) an automatic appeal of death
sentences to the Georgia Supreme Court for examination of evidence
and proportionality. 3 7 The Court concluded that the Georgia statute
was constitutional and within the spirit of Furman which prohibited only
death penalty procedures that allowed the jury to condemn prisoners to
death capriciously and arbitrarily.3 8 The Court found that under Geor-
gia's new death penalty statute, the jury could not impose the death sen-
tence "wantonly and freakishly" since it was directed by specific
legislative guidelines.39 By specifying the concept of proportionality as
a crucial factor in analyzing the constitutionality of the death penalty
plex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legisla-
tures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of
their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not
available to the courts. Indeed, many of the post-Furman statutes re-
flect just such a responsible effort to define those crimes and those
criminals for which capital punishment is most probably an effective
deterrent.
Id. at 185-86 (citations and footnotes omitted).
35. Id. at 187. In rejecting the petitioner's claim that the death penalty was
disproportionate as applied to him, the Court stated:
There is no question that death as a punishment is unique in its severity
and irrevocability. When a defendant's life is at stake, the Court has
been particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed.
But we are concerned here only with the imposition of capital punish-
ment for the crime of murder, and when a life has been deliberately
taken by the offender, we cannot say that the punishment is invariably
disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the
most extreme of crimes.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at 196-207. The Court examined the new sentencing statute in light
of the Furman decision and the eight and fourteenth amendments' prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment and determined that it was constitutionally
sound. Id.
37. Id. at 196-98. For further discussion of these factors, see LAFAvE &
ScoTr, supra note 3, § 2.14, at 178.
38. 428 U.S. at 206. With this statement, the Gregg court effectively set the
speculative limits of the Furman decision. Id. Furman does not forbid imposition
of the death penalty, but rather forbids the imposition of the death penalty
under statutes which allow for its arbitrary and capricious infliction. Id. For a
discussion of Furman, see supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
39. 428 U.S. at 206-07. The effect of these new legislative guidelines was to
19881 NOTE 375
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and capital sentencing statutes under the eighth amendment, the Gregg
Court raised what was to become the most serious modern challenge to
the whole idea of capital punishment. 40 Although the Court failed to
fully develop the proportionality concept in Gregg, the decision left open
the controversial issue of whether capital punishment was appropriate
for any crime apart from intentional murder.
3. Using Proportionality Analysis to End Capital Sentencing of Rapists:
Coker v. Georgia
The eighth amendment proportionality analysis introduced in Gregg
reappeared one year later in Coker v. Georgia.4 1 In Coker, a plurality of the
Justices held that the death penalty was disproportionate to the crime of
rape, and thus violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 4 2 By
invalidating an instance of capital punishment solely on grounds of dis-
proportionality under the eighth and fourteenth amendments, the Coker
decision firmly established proportionality as a serious challenge to
death penalty statutes and a new avenue of attack for critics of capital
punishment. 4 3 In framing the plurality's proportionality analysis, Jus-
tice White examined the historical, legislative and judicial contexts
against which the death penalty for rape existed and concluded that cap-
ital punishment was an excessive punishment for that particular crime. 4 4
"focus the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the par-
ticularized characteristics of the individual defendant." Id. at 206.
40. For a discussion of the major proportionality cases which followed
Gregg, see infra notes 41-114 and accompanying text.
41. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Coker, after escaping from a Georgia prison
where he was serving life terms for murder, rape, kidnapping and aggravated
assault, raped a woman in the course of burglarizing her house. Id. at 587.
Coker was sentenced to death according to Georgia law which provided that
rape was punishable by death, life imprisonment or imprisonment for between
one and twenty years. Id. at 586-91 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972)
(repealed 1982)).
42. For a detailed discussion of Coker and its place in the context of eighth
amendment challenges to the death penalty, see Comment, supra note 9, at 356-
61.
43. See, Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standard for the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1062 (1978) (analyzing Coker
and its contribution to constitutional standards of review and concluding that, if
applied rightfully, the Coker standard would invalidate the death penalty in all
cases); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 128 (1977) (observing
Coker raises doubts as to whether death penalty can be imposed for hijacking,
treason and other crimes against masses of people).
44. 433 U.S. at 592-99. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice White
observed:
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it
does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified tak-
ing of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime,
rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious
injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the
376 [Vol. 33: p. 367
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B. The Death Penalty and the Felony Murderer
1. Narrowing Application of the Death Penalty to Felony Murderers through
Specific Mental State Requirements: Enmund v. Florida
In Enmund v. Florida,45 the United States Supreme Court first ap-
plied its post-Furman jurisprudence specifically to defendants sentenced
to die for participation in felonies in which a felon other than the de-
fendant takes life.4 6 According to the Court, Earl Enmund waited in a
getaway car outside the home of Thomas and Eunice Kersey while
Sampson and Jeannette Armstrong, Enmund's accomplices, carried out
the plan to rob the elderly residents. 4 7 During the robbery, Sampson
Armstrong killed the Kerseys and fled with Jeannette in the getaway car
driven by Enmund.
48
Enmund was tried along with Sampson Armstrong and convicted
under Florida's felony murder statute. 49 At a separate sentencing hear-
ing, the jury, without written findings, advised the judge to seek the
death penalty. 50 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court remanded the
case for written findings as required by Florida's death penalty statute. 5 '
On remand, the trial judge found four statutory aggravating circum-
stances and no mitigating circumstances. 5 2 Enmund was sentenced to
rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over
and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that
the death penalty, which "is unique in its severity and irrevocability," is
an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human
life.
Id. at 598 (footnote and citation omitted).
45. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
46. This class of felons includes many of those convicted under state felony
murder statutes. For a discussion of the felony murder doctrine, see supra notes
5-9 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of Enmund and its holding,
see Comment, supra note 11; Note, supra note 11; Casenote, supra note 11; Case-
note, Constitutional Law--The Eighth Amendment Prohibits the Penalty of Death for One
Who Neither Took Life, Attempted or Intended to Take Life, Nor Contemplated that Life
Would be Taken, 28 VILL. L. REV. 173 (1982).
47. 458 U.S. at 784. When Thomas Kersey answered the Armstrongs'
knock, Sampson Armstrong grabbed the elderly man who immediately cried out
for help. Id. Responding to her husband's call, Eunice Kersey shot and
wounded Jeanette Armstrong. Id. Sampson, and perhaps Jeanette, then shot
and killed both Kerseys, dragged them into the kitchen, and fled with their
money. Id. Enmund drove the getaway car. Id.
48. Id. at 784-85. It is unclear whether Jeanette Armstrong also shot at the
Kerseys. Id. at 784.
49. Id. at 785 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(l)(a) (1976)).
50. Id. Florida's post-Furman death penalty statute provided for a bifur-
cated trial of the type sanctioned by the Court in Gregg. Id. Under the statute,
Enmund was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and, at a separate
hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty. Id. For a discussion of the
Gregg case, see supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
51. 458 U.S. at 785 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (1981)).
52. Id. The trial judge found the following aggravating circumstances:
(1) that the murder was committed while Enmund was an accomplice in an
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death on two counts of first degree murder.53 Although the Florida
Supreme Court rejected two of the trial court's aggravating circum-
stances, it finally affirmed Enmund's death sentence based on the re-
maining aggravating circumstances. 54 In doing so, the Florida court
stated that "the felony murder rule and the law of principles combine to
make a defendant generally responsible for the lethal acts of his co-
felon."'5 5 The United States Supreme Court granted Enmund's writ of
certiorari to consider "whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted
to take life, nor intended to take life." '56
In its majority decision, the Supreme Court reversed Enmund's cap-
ital sentence after applying a proportionality analysis which incorpo-
rated the criteria set forth in Gregg and Coker.5 7 After a survey of state
statutes, the Court found that only eight allowed capital punishment
"solely because the defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the
armed robbery; (2) that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain;
(3) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; and (4) that En-
mund had a previous conviction for a felony involving violence. Id. (citing FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(b), (d), (f) & (h) (1981)).
53. Id. Under the Florida Statute, first degree murder is defined as follows:
(1)(a) The unlawful killing of a human being:
1. When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the
death of the person killed or any human being; or
2. When committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of,
or in the attempt to perpetrate, any:
a. Trafficking offense prohibited by § 893.135(1),
b. Arson,
c. Sexual battery,
d. Robbery,
e. Burglary,
f. Kidnapping,
g. Escape,
h. Aggravated child abuse,
i. Aircraft piracy, or
j. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive de-
vice or bomb; or
3. Which resulted from the unlawful distribution of opium or any
synthetic or natural salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of
opium by a person 18 years of age or older, when such drug is proven
to be the proximate cause of the death of the user, is murder in the first
degree and constitutes a capital felony, punishable as provided in
§ 775.082.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (1976).
54. 458 U.S. at 787.
55. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 782
(1982).
56. 458 U.S. at 787.
57. Id. at 789-801. For an in-depth discussion of the Court's analysis in and
the facts of Enmund, see Note, supra note 11, at 861-66.
For a discussion of Gregg, see supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of Coker and its proportionality analysis, see supra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text.
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course of which a murder was committed."-58 Beyond this, the Court
noted that society's standards, as reflected injury decisions, were evolv-
ing to a point where the death penalty for felons who neither kill, at-
tempt to kill nor intend to kill was disproportionate and violated the
requisite standards of individual culpability set forth in previous cases. 59
Finally, the Court concluded that giving Enmund the same punishment
as Sampson Armstrong, who in fact killed the Kerseys, frustrated any
legitimate retributive or deterrent interest society might have in punish-
ing criminal offenders. 60 Summarizing the Court's analysis, Justice
White reasoned that "the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of
the death penalty on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in
the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not
himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that
lethal force will be employed." 6 1
Unhappy with what she thought was the Court's imposition of an
intent requirement on the states before they could sentence felony mur-
derers to death, 62 Justice O'Connor led the dissenters. She attacked the
58. 458 U.S. at 789 n.5 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 189, 190.2(a)(17) (West
Supp. 1982)); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04(1)(a), 775.082(1), 921.141(5)(d)
(1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101(b), (c), 27-2534.1(b)(2) (1978) (repealed
1982); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19(2)(e), 99-19-101(5)(d) (Supp. 1981); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 200.030(l)(b), 200.030(4), 200-033(4) (1981); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-3-10, 16-3-20(C)(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2402(a), 39-2404(i)(7) (Supp. 1981); WYo. STAT. §§ 6-4-101, 6-4-
102(h)(iv) (1977)).
59. Id. at 795. Justice White concluded that: "[tihe evidence is overwhelm-
ing that American juries have repudiated imposition of the death penalty for
crimes such as petitioner's." Id. at 794.
60. Id. at 798-801. For a discussion of the deterrent and retributive func-
tions of criminal punishment, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
61. 458 U.S. at 797. Justice White further explained, however, that "it
would be very different if the likelihood of killing in the course of a robbery were
so substantial that one should share the blame for the killing if he somehow
participated in the felony." Id. at 799. These words were later used by Justice
O'Connor in Tison to severely restrict the applicability of Enmund. Tison, 107 S.
Ct. at 1681 (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799). For a discussion of Tison, see infra
notes 72-114 and accompanying text.
62. 458 U.S. at 823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The actual holding of the
Enmund decision is somewhat elusive. In applying Enmund, jurisdictions differ
tremendously as to what mental state is required under the case. See, e.g., Skil-
lern v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 837, 843 (5th Cir. 1983) (Enmund requires that lethal
force be used), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984); Clark v. Louisiana State Peniten-
tiary, 694 F.2d 75, 76 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982) (Enmund requires that defendant con-
template that a killing will occur); United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 678
(10th Cir. 1982) (Enmund holds that Constitution prohibits imposing death pen-
alty on defendant who did not kill or attempt to kill unless defendant intended
that a killing occur); Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 83, 656 S.W.2d 684, 686 (1983)
(Enmund requires that defendant contemplated lethal force would be used), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862 (1983) (Enmund requires actual discharge of weapon
before death penalty can be imposed);Johnson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 812, 295 S.E.2d
63 (1982) (Enmund requires only that defendant use lethal force in any way, as in
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failure of the plurality to consider the harm caused by the defendant's
criminal action along with his mens rea in determining whether capital
punishment was appropriate.6 3 Such an intent requirement, she rea-
soned, "not only interferes with state criteria for assessing legal guilt,"
but also interferes with the sentencer's own unique ability to assess the
individual circumstances of each defendant. 64  Although Justice
O'Connor saw the defendant's mental state as essential to determining
the proper punishment, it was not, for her, "so critical a factor in deter-
mining blameworthiness as to require a finding of intent to kill in order
to impose the death penalty for felony murder." 6
5
Whatever significance the Enmund holding was meant to have, state
courts and commentators differ dramatically in their views as to what
effect the decision ought to have on courts dealing with felony murder-
ers. 66 Despite its unclear language, however, the Enmund majority, as
several commentators suggest, seems concerned with two problems
over which the state courts differ: (1) the importance of individual cul-
pability for the imposition of capital punishment on convicted felony
murderers, and (2) the importance of the jury's role in determining
whether a culpable mental state is factually present for one convicted
and otherwise deserving of a capital sentence.
6 7
threatening with a gun), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 (1983); State v. Gibson, 106
Idaho 54, 675 P.2d 33 (1983) (Enmund holds that Constitution prohibits impos-
ing death penalty on a defendant who did not kill or attempt to kill, unless the
defendant intended that a killing occur), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220 (1984); State
v. Moore, 432 So.2d 226 n. 14 (La. 1983) (same); Smith v. State, 659 P.2d 330,
334 n.2 (Okla. Crim. App.) (same), modified on appeal, 104 S. Ct. 324 (1983); State
v. Stokes, 308 N.C. 634, 649, 304 S.E. 2d 184, 194 (1983) (Enmund requires that
defendant contemplate a killing will occur); Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777, 794
(Wyo. 1983) (Enmund requires killing, attempt to kill or intent to kill or that
lethal force be employed).
63. 458 U.S. at 823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor criticized
the majority's failure to explain why the eighth amendment concept of propor-
tionality requires rejection of standards of blameworthiness based on levels of
intent, other than intent to kill. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Specifically, Jus-
tice O'Connor pointed to the intent to commit an armed robbery, coupled with
the knowledge that armed robberies involved substantial risk of death to others,
as a level of intent sufficient to impose the death penalty. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
64. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor did, however,
agree that the case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing since the
Florida Supreme Court rejected factual findings critical to the trial court's death
penalty verdict. Id. at 827-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
66. For a discussion of the diverse state court interpretations of Enmund's
mental state requirement, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
67. See Comment, supra note 11 (noting dual proposition suggested in text
and offering thoughtful proposals for clarification of problem areas); Note, supra
note 11, at 869-83 (same).
[Vol. 33: p. 367
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2. Limiting the Jury's Role in Determining the Non-Triggerman's Mental
State: Cabana v. Bullock
Clarification of the jury's role, the second of the Enmund Court's
two concerns, came quite recently with the Court's decision in Cabana v.
Bullock. 68 Writing for the Cabana majority, Justice White concluded that
the eighth amendment does not require the jury to make a specific de-
termination of a felony murderer's mental state as long as the determi-
nation is made at some point in the state's procedural process.6 9
According to Cabana, when confronted with a petition for habeas corpus,
in a case for which the jury has not considered the defendant's mental
state, a federal district court should remand the case to the state courts
for this determination, but the jury need never become involved. 70
Thereafter, if the mental state determination is made by an appellate
court, a judge, or a jury, the federal court must accept that determina-
tion as a matter of federal law. 7 1
68. 474 U.S. 376 (1986). Respondent Crawford Bullock was found guilty of
capital murder under a Mississippi law which made killings during the course of
robbery or attempted robbery capital murder. Id. at 381. According to the
Court, Bullock assisted his friend, Ricky Tucker, while Tucker repeatedly beat
Mark Dickson about the head after an argument. Id. at 379. Bullock helped
Tucker dispose of Dickson's body and kept Dickson's car for his own use. Id.
The jury recommended the death sentence for Bullock, finding two statutory
aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. Id. at 381. On ap-
peal, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Bullock's argument that his limited
involvement in the murder made the death penalty disproportionate. Id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, assuming that Enmund re-
quired a jury finding of "intent to kill" before imposing capital punishment, re-
versed Bullock's death sentence finding that the jury might never have
considered Bullock's mental state. Id. at 382. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts as to which point during a
state's procedural 'system the requirements of Enmund must be satisfied. Id.
69. Id. at 392. Justice White concluded:
The proceeding that the state courts must provide Bullock need not
take the form of a new sentencing hearing before a jury. As indicated
above, the Eighth Amendment does not require that a jury make the
findings required by Enmund. Moreover, the sentence currently in force
may stand provided only that the requisite findings are made in an ade-
quate proceeding before some appropriate tribunal-be it an appellate
court, a trial judge, or a jury. A new hearing devoted to the identifica-
tion and weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors is thus, as far as
we are concerned, unnecessary.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 392.
71. Id. at 390-92 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1948)). Section 2254(d)
provides:
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits
of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a
proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an of-
ficer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, writ-
ten opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be
15
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3. Readdressing Minimum Mental State Requirements in the Sentencing of
Non-Triggerman to Death. Tison v. Arizona
Tison v. Arizona 72 presented the Court with its first opportunity to
examine and clarify the minimum culpable mental state required for im-
position of the death penalty on non-triggermen. On July 30, 1978, the
three Tison brothers, Donald, Ricky, and Raymond, entered the Ari-
zona State Prison at Florence and gave weapons to their convict father,
Gary, and his co-inmate, Randy Greenwalt. 73 After fleeing the prison
without exchanging fire, the five headed toward Flagstaff, Arizona.
7 4
Along the way, the group flagged down a passing motorist to replace
presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall
otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the
State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the
State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or
over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in depri-
vation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent
him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate
hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in
the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding
in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to
a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such fac-
tual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the
Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole
concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court,
when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless
the existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth
in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant,
otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the
court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8)
that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole,
does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall
rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the fac-
tual determination by the State court was erroneous.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1948).
72. 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987).
73. Id. at 1678. Gary Tison was serving a life sentence for a previous es-
cape attempt during the course of which he killed a prison guard. Id. Randy
Greenwalt was also a convicted murderer. Id. The Tison family, including
Gary's wife Dorothy, brotherJoe, and three sons, Ricky, Raymond, and Donald,
had planned the escape and had collected the arsenal of weapons which the
three brothers took into the prison. Id.
74. Id.
382
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their broken-down automobile. 75 Gary Tison held the driver, John Ly-
ons, and his family at gunpoint and then ordered his sons to get the
captives some water from the Lyons' car. 76 Despite some discrepancy in
the brothers' testimony, the trial court found that Ricky and Raymond
Tison watched their father and Greenwalt murder the family with re-
peated shotgun blasts, and that neither brother attempted to help the
victims.
77
After fleeing the bloodbath, the fugitives were finally stopped at a
police roadblock several days later. 78 Donald Tison was killed in a
shootout with the police and Gary Tison fled into the desert where he
subsequently died of exposure. 79 Raymond and Ricky Tison, as well as
Randy Greenwalt, were jointly tried and convicted for the crimes sur-
rounding the prison break and final shootout.80 Each was tried sepa-
rately for the four murders, armed robbery, kidnapping, and car theft.8 1
Raymond and Ricky Tison were charged with capital murder in ac-
cordance with Arizona's felony murder 82 and accomplice liability83 stat-
utes. Both were convicted and later sentenced by a procedure which
provided for the consideration of various aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances delineated in the Arizona death penalty statute. 84 The sen-
tencing judge found three statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the
75. Id. Randy Tison stood by the broken-down car to flag down a motorist
while the other men lay hidden by the side of the road. Id. at 1678-79.
76. Id. at 1679. John Lyons was travelling with his wife, Donnelda, his two
year old son, Christopher, and fifteen year old niece, Theresa. Id. The four
armed men emerged from the side of the road and forced the family into the
back of the Lincoln. Id. After driving both cars off the main road, Gary Tison
ordered the family to stand in the headlights of the Lincoln while the other men
transferred their belongings from their Lincoln to the Lyons' Mazda. Id. Gary
Tison then directed Raymond to drive the Lincoln further into the desert after
which he fired his shotgun into the car's radiator. Id. The Lyons family was then
conducted to the new sight and again forced to stand in the Lincoln's headlights.
Id. Throughout this time, John Lyons pleaded with his captors to leave him and
his family unharmed. Id.
77. Id. Raymond Tison reported being at the Mazda getting water when
the first shots were fired. Id. Ricky Tison stated that he and Raymond had al-
ready returned with-the water jug and given it to their father when the first shots
were fired. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (1956) (repealed 1978)). For
a brief discussion of Arizona's felony murder law, see supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text.
83. 107 S. Ct. at 1679 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-139 (1956) (re-
pealed 1978)). For a discussion of Arizona's accomplice liability statute and ac-
complice liability generally, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
84. 107 S. Ct. at 1680 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454 (1973) (re-
pealed 1978)). For a discussion of Arizona's death penalty statute, see supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
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brothers created a grave risk of death to others; (2) the murders were
committed for pecuniary gain; and (3) the murders were especially hei-
nous.8 5 The judge also found that the "participation of each [peti-
tioner] in the crimes giving rise to application of the felony murder rule
was very substantial." 8 6 Based on these findings, Raymond and Ricky
Tison were sentenced to death. 8 7
The Arizona Supreme Court on automatic appeal rejected the
"grave risk of death" findings, but affirmed the death penalty on the
"pecuniary gain" and "heinousness" factors alone.8 8 Significantly, the
Arizona Supreme Court also found that the brothers had not specifically
intended to kill, but that their continued participation in the prison
break and the crimes incident to the prison break were actions culpable
enough to justify the death sentence.8 9 The Supreme Court denied the
Tisons' petition for certiorari in 1982.90
After the Supreme Court's decision in Enmund v. Florida,9 1 the peti-
tioners again attacked their death sentences by arguing in post-convic-
tion proceedings that Enmund required a finding of intent to kill-a
mental state specifically found lacking on their first appeal. 9 2 The Ari-
zona Supreme Court, despite its earlier finding of no intent, nonetheless
affirmed the Tisons' death sentence, holding that the Enmund intent re-
quirement was satisfied since each Tison "could anticipate the use of
lethal force during [the] attempt to flee confinement." '9 3 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to examine the Ari-
zona Supreme Court's application of Enmund and to clarify the Enmund
holding in the face of varying state interpretations. 9 4
With an analysis closely tracing that of Coker, Cabana and Enmund,
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion vacated the judgments of the lower
court and remanded the case. 95 After outlining the facts of the Tison
85. 107 S. Ct. at 1680.
86. Id. (quoting App. 284-85). The judge also found three non-statutory
mitigating circumstances: (1) the age of the defendants (Raymond, 19; Ricky,
20); (2) neither had prior felony records; and (3) each had been convicted under
the felony murder rule. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing State v. (Ricky Wayne) Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 545, 633 P.2d
335, 354 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982)).
89. Id. at 1681.
90. Id. at 1680 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 459 U.S. 882 (1982)).
91. For a discussion of Enmund, see supra notes 45-67 and accompanying
text.
92. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1680.
93. Id. at 1681 (citing State v. (Raymond Curtis) Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 456-
57, 690 P.2d 755, 757-58 (1984), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987)).
94. Id. at 1681-82. For a discussion of the various state court interpreta-
tions of Enmund, see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
95. 107 S. Ct. at 1688. The case was remanded in order to determine
whether the defendants acted with reckless indifference to human life-the sec-
ond part of the Tison test, to determine if a non-triggerman may be sentenced to
[Vol. 33: p. 367384
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case, Justice O'Connor immediately qualified the Court's holding in En-
mund. She stated that the Enmund holding applied only to "two distinct
subsets of all felony murders": (1) those in which the defendant was a
minor participant in an armed robbery, and for whom the death penalty
was inappropriate, 9 6 and (2) those in which the felony murderer actually
killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, and for whom the death
penalty was appropriate. 9 7 Having set the parameters of its decision in
Enmund, the Court then noted its dissatisfaction with the Arizona
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Enmund intent requirement as sat-
isfied merely if the defendant intends, contemplates, or anticipates that
"lethal force would or might be used, or that life would or might be
taken in accomplishing the underlying felony."9 8 The Tison case, the
Court reasoned, fell into neither of Enmund's two distinct categories
since the record supported a finding that neither brother specifically in-
tended to kill, although both were major participants in the escape and
other crimes surrounding the murder of the Lyons family. 99 Catego-
rizing Tison as a middle case, falling somewhere between the categories
discussed in Enmund, the Court formulated the issue as "whether the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty in. the intermediate case
of the defendant whose participation is major and whose mental state is
one of reckless indifference to the value of human life." 10 0
The Tison Court began its proportionality analysis with a survey of
state legislatures and their judgments on defendants who do not intend
to kill, but who act with reckless indifference to human life during the
course of a felony in which another felon takes life.' 0 ' Of the states
which allowed the death penalty for felony murder, the Court found
four which required a showing of "recklessness or extreme indifference
to human life" before the death penalty could be imposed on felony
murderers,' 0 2 two which required "substantial participation" in the fel-
death. Id. The first part of the test, the fact that defendants were major partici-
pants in a felony, was established for both defendants at trial. Id.
96. Id. at 1684. Enmund himself fell into this first category for which the
Court found imposition of the death penalty disproportionate and a violation of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Enmund, 458 U.S. 782, 801.
97. 107 S. Ct. at 1684.
98. Id. (citing State v. (Raymond Curtis) Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 456, 690
P.2d 755, 757 (1984), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987)).
99. Id. at 1684. The Court drew its conclusion that both the Tisons were
major participants in the crimes from the record of the brothers' first appeal to
the Arizona Supreme Court. Id.
100. Id. at 1685. The Court's conclusion that the Tisons acted with "reck-
less indifference" was not found in the lower court record and prompted sharp
criticism from the dissenters. Id. at 1691 (Brennan,J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion of the dissent, see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
101. 107 S. Ct. at 1685. For a discussion of the impact of legislative judg-
ments on other major death penalty decisions, see supra notes 44, 58 and accom-
panying text.
102. 107 S. Ct. at 1685 n.5. The relevant states include Arkansas, Dela-
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ony by the defendant, 10 3 and six, including Arizona, which took "minor
participation" in the felony into account as a mitigating factor.' 0 4 In
addition to these, the Court found that six states allowed the death pen-
alty for felony murder simpliciter,10 5 and three required an additional ag-
gravating factor beyond mere participation in the felony before capital
punishment could be imposed. 10 6 Finally, the Court noted that only
eleven states which authorized capital punishment in some instances for-
bid its imposition when the defendant acted with reckless disregard for
human life. 10 7 Having completed its survey, the Court concluded that
"our society does not reject the death penalty as grossly excessive under
these circumstances." '
08
The Tison majority next reviewed state judicial interpretations and
noted "an apparent consensus that substantial participation in a violent
felony under circumstances likely to result in the loss of innocent human
life may justify the death penalty even absent an intent to kill."' 1 9 Addi-
tionally, the Court considered the facts of Tison against its survey of state
legislative and judicial judgments first by emphasizing the importance of
mental state in determining the culpability of criminal defendants gener-
ally.' 10 Despite its reverence for mens rea with regard to criminal sen-
tencing, however, the Court noted that an intent requirement was "a
highly unsatisfactory means of definitely distinguishing the most culpa-
ble and dangerous murderers.""' In passages which largely echo her
ware, Kentucky, and Illinois. For a discussion of these statutes, see supra note 5
and accompanying text.
103. 107 S. Ct. at 1685 n.6. The relevant jurisdictions are Connecticut and
the federal courts. For a discussion of these statutes, see supra note 5 and ac-
companying text.
104. 107 S. Ct. at 1685 n.7. The relevant states are Arizona, Colorado,
Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, and North Carolina. For a discussion of these stat-
utes, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
105. 107 S. Ct. at 1685-86 n.8. The relevant states are California, Florida,
Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming. For a discussion of these
statutes, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
106. 107 S. Ct. at 1686 n.9. The relevant states are Idaho, Oklahoma, and
South Dakota. For a discussion of these statutes, see supra note 5 and accompa-
nying text.
107. 107 S. Ct. at 1686 n.10. The relevant states are Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and
Virginia. For a discussion of these statutes, see supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
108. 107 S. Ct. at 1686 (emphasis supplied by the Court) (citing substantial
and recent authorization of death penalty for crime of felony murder regardless
of absence of finding of intent to kill).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1687. The Court cited Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), to point out the importance of
mental state in assessing culpability under guided discretion statutes. Id. For a
discussion of Lockett, see supra note 22.
111. 107 S. Ct. at 1687. Justice O'Connor noted that
some nonintentional murderers may be among the most dangerous and
[Vol. 33: p. 367386
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dissent in Enmund, Justice O'Connor pointed to the common law and
modern criminal codes, which equate reckless killing with intentional
murders, to support her proposition that felons who act with reckless
disregard for human life are, in at least some circumstances, deserving
of death." 2 Summing up her Tison analysis, Justice O'Connor con-
cluded "that the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly
engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death rep-
resents a highly culpable mental state [that] may be taken into account in
making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natu-
ral, though also not inevitable, lethal result."' 13 Deriving each brother's
"major participation" from the lower court record, the Court remanded
the case for a determination of whether Raymond or Ricky Tison acted
with reckless disregard for human life in the felonies which culminated
in the death of the Lyons family. 1 14
III. ANALYSIS
The most immediate and far-reaching effect of the Court's decision
in Tison is its impact on the mental state findings required before a state
can sentence a felony murderer to death.'15 Previously, the Court had
attempted to define the requisite mental state in Enmund v. Florida by
holding that a participant in a felony during the course of which a mur-
der takes place could not be sentenced to death unless he killed, at-
tempted to kill, or intended to kill or use lethal force. 1 6 However, the
Enmund majority did not set forth the mental state requirement for situa-
tions in which "the likelihood of killing ... [was] so substantial that [the
felon] should share the blame for the killing." ' 1 7 In the wake of En-
mund's ambiguous holding, the states' interpretations of Enmund varied,
inhumane of all-the person who tortures another not caring whether
the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the
course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the intent to
rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim.
Id. at 1688.
112. Id. at 1688. Justice O'Connor cites the Model Penal Code as an exam-
ple of one modern criminal code which equates reckless killing with intentional
killing. Id. (citing A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, 13).
In his dissent, Justice Brennan points out that the Model Penal Code advo-
cates abolishing the felony murder rule in its entirety. Id. at 1689 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
113. Id. at 1688.
114. Id. For a discussion of the procedural posture of the Tison case, as well
as a presumption not explicitly contained in the record that both brothers did
act with reckless disregard for human life, see supra notes 91-94.
115. For a discussion of the mental state requirements imposed by the
Court prior to Tison, see the discussion of Enmund v. Florida, supra notes 45-67
and accompanying text.
116. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797. For further discussion of the Court's hold-
ing in Enmund, see supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
117. 458 U.S. at 799.
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yet no state which had sentenced a nontriggerman to death after Enmund
actually carried out the punishment.' 18
In response to the confusion created by Enmund, the Tison majority
narrowed the scope of Enmund by applying the Enmund mens rea standard
only to defendants who were minor participants in the felony which led
to murder. 1 9 However, for major felony participants like the Tison
brothers, the Court held that a lower mental state, one of "reckless in-
difference to human life," was sufficiently grave to justify capital
punishment. 120
The Court's new recklessness standard provides an easily applied
and highly culpable mental state against which to measure those non-
triggermen whose criminal acts end in death. 12 1 Assuming the validity
of the majority's analysis discussed below, this new standard is an impor-
tant step toward a more workable and consistent death penalty jurispru-
dence which will, in addition to avoiding arbitrary infliction of capital
punishment on felony murderers,' 22 protect society's legitimate interest
in deterrence and retribution by embracing only the "most culpable and
dangerous of murderers."' 12 3 Lending credence to the majority's opin-
ion, Justice White, who wrote the Court's opinion in Enmund, approved
the major/minor participant distinction by joining the Court in Tison.12 4
Despite the majority's apparent comfort with the major/minor par-
ticipant distinction, Tison is arguably an unjustified departure from En-
118. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1698 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the state courts' reluctance to impose the
death penalty on felony murderers was a sure indication of its unconstitutional-
ity. Id.
For a discussion of the diverse state interpretations of Enmund, see supra
note 62 and accompanying text.
119. 107 S. Ct. at 1684. For a discussion of the confusion resulting from
the Court's holding in Enmund, see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
120. 107 S. Ct. at 1688.
121. Id. In articulating the Court's holding, Justice O'Connor remarked on
the superiority of the new recklessness standard in dealing with nontriggermen:
[T]he reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging
in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a
highly culpable mental state, that may be taken into account in making
a capital sentencing judgment, when that conduct causes its natural,
though also not inevitable, lethal result.
Id.
122. Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the reluctance of the states to
execute non-triggermen who did not intend to kill makes any instance of capital
punishment under these circumstances arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1701
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1687. Justice O'Connor's opinion emphasized the harm caused
by the criminal's action as vital to assessing his individual culpability. Id. at
1687-88.
For a discussion of the Court's view of the deterrence and retribution ratio-
nales for capital punishment, see supra note 34.
124. 107 S. Ct. at 1678.
388 [Vol. 33: p. 367
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss2/4
1988] NOTE 389
mund.' 25 Justice Brennan persuasively characterized the death penalty
as inappropriate in the felony murder context where a homicidal mental
state is imputed from participation in a crime separate from the mur-
der.126 Pointing to evidence in the record which he felt suggested that
the Tison brothers were more victims of their parents' conditioning than
conscious criminals, Justice Brennan also challenged the majority's as-
sumption that the facts supported a finding that the brothers acted with
reckless disregard for human life. 127
In the wake of Tison, Justice Brennan's imputed mental state criti-
cism has been displaced by a new dilemma. On the one hand, cases like
Tison and Enmund eliminate the controversial imputed mental state ele-
ment with which Justice Brennan is concerned by requiring specific
mental state findings before a felony murderer can be sentenced to
death. On the other hand, however, the Court's decision in Cabana v.
Bullock alters the effectiveness of these safeguards by allowing non-juries
to make the required mental state findings often far removed from the
trial situation. 1 28
As some commentators have suggested, Enmund represents two sig-
nificant aspects of death sentencing requirements: (1) the central im-
portance of mental state to an individual defendant's culpability, and
(2) the importance of the jury's role in determining whether a culpable
mental state is factually present. 129 Decidedly, Tison preserved and clar-
ified the mental state concern by requiring mere recklessness (and not
always intent) on the part of some felony murderers before the death
penalty could be imposed. 130 However, Cabana seriously altered En-
mund's concern with maintaining the jury's role by holding that "the
Eighth Amendment does not require that a jury make the findings re-
quired by Enmund."l 3 l By allowing the jury to by-pass the mental state
question before sentencing and accepting a mental state determination
made at practically any point in the state's appellate process, the Cabana
Court abandoned a significant safeguard for felony murder defendants
125. Id. at 1698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1689 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of the
controversy surrounding the felony murder doctrine, see supra notes 6-9 and
accompanying text.
127. 107 S. Ct. at 1691 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted the
majority's anomalous behavior in assuming, allegedly based on the record, that
the defendant's actions represented a mental state or reckless disregard for
human life. Id. at 1696 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This finding was never explic-
itly found in the lower court. It was, therefore, necessary to remand the case for
a finding as to whether the mental state of recklessness existed. Id. at 1692-93
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. 474 U.S. 376, 392 (1986). For a detailed discussion of the Cabana
case, see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
129. For a discussion of these commentators' views, see supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
130. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1688.
131. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 392.
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facing capital punishment. In Cabana, the Court simply failed to give
sufficient recognition to the jury as the essential voice of community val-
ues in the criminal law.' 3 2
In reaching its conclusion on the mental state necessary to sentence
a felony murderer to death, the Court in Tison engaged in an eighth
amendment proportionality analysis now firmly established in the area
of capital punishment.' 33 Justice O'Connor's survey of twenty-two state
legislatures which permit the death penalty for felony murderers is per-
suasive in support of her conclusion that "society does not reject the
death penalty as grossly excessive under these circumstances.' 1 4 Fur-
ther bolstering her conclusion is her observation that a number of state
courts have interpreted Enmund to allow the death penalty in cases
where the felons have acted with reckless disregard for human life.
13 5
As illustrated by Justice Brennan, the validity of the majority's legis-
lative and judicial survey is subject to legitimate attack because the court
considered only states which allow the death penalty for felony murder
132. The role of the jury in safeguarding the rights of those who may be
sentenced to death was well stated by Justice Stewart in Gregg v. Georgia.
The jury also is a significant and reliable objective index of con-
temporary values because it is so directly involved. The Court has said
that "one of the most important functions any jury can perform in mak-
ing ... a selection [between life imprisonment and death for a defend-
ant convicted in a capital case] is to maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system." It may be true
that evolving standards have influenced juries in recent decades to be
more discriminating in opposing the sentence of death.
428 U.S. at 181-82 (footnotes and citations omitted).
At least one commentator has affirmed this view with specific reference to
Enmund:
Critics may wonder why an already overburdened court system need go
through the wasted time and expense of remanding a case on an appar-
ent technicality, even when the evidence overwhelmingly shows that the
defendant has a sufficiently culpable mental state. But trial judges can
easily avoid this problem simply by giving an instruction, sua sponte, that
if the jury convicts the defendant under a felony murder theory, it must
come to some finding regarding the defendant's mental state [under
Enmund]-before imposing the death sentence. On balance, it is better
to compel trial judges to make the extra effort of such a sua sponte in-
struction than to leave any possibility that the jury sentenced a defend-
ant to death without being forced to make a finding regarding his
culpability. The death penalty cases leading up to Enmund not only deal
with individual rights of the defendant, but with the value of the jury as
the embodiment of community conscience. By examining jury behav-
ior, the Court has frequently come to conclusions about the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty for certain behavior. It would be
unfortunate if this vital function of the jury were dissipated.
Note, supra note 11, at 887-88 (footnotes and citations omitted).
133. For a discussion of the major proportionality cases leading up to Tison,
see supra notes 15-67 and accompanying text.
134. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1686. For a discussion of Tison's survey of state
statutes, see supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
135. 107 S. Ct. at 1686-87.
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in reaching its conclusion that "an apparent consensus" of the states
accept the death penalty as an appropriate punishment for criminals like
the Tison brothers. 136 In view of the additional states which have abol-
ished the death penalty entirely, about three-fifths of all American juris-
dictions reject the majority's position. 13 7 It is also important to note
that even in those jurisdictions which statutorily provide for the death
penalty in these situations, the death sentence is almost never carried
out for felony murderers who do not kill or specifically intend to kill.
138
These deficiencies in the majority's survey led Justice Brennan to con-
clude that there is no societal consensus affirming the death penalty as
an appropriate punishment for nontriggermen who do not intend to
kill. 139 He also concluded that in those rare cases where the death pen-
alty is imposed on such criminals, the state acts in an arbitrary and thus
unconstitutional manner. 140
Despite the forcefulness ofJustice Brennan's dissent, the number of
states which apparently do not authorize the death penalty for nontrig-
germen and the reluctance of those who do authorize it to impose it are
not factors fatal to the majority's analysis. 14 1 While it may be true, as
Justice Brennan observed, that no state within the past twenty-five years
has executed a nontriggerman absent a finding of intent to kill, those
numbers are no doubt affected by the general confusion which has
plagued death penalty/felony murder jurisprudence particularly with re-
gard to the felon's mental state. 142 It is at best difficult to determine
what the states have been doing in practice with their felony murder
sentencing procedures over the past twenty-five years. Indeed, the im-
portance of mental state to the capital sentencing process for felony
murderers has only been a matter of constitutional importance since the
Court's 1982 decision in Enmund.' 4 3
Unfortunately, Enmund did little to resolve the issue of whether in-
tent was a required element in the capital sentencing of any nontrig-
german.14 4 However, the Tison majority, with its reckless disregard for
136. Id. at 1697 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing the majority opinion at
1685-86).
137. Id. The District of Columbia and the following 14 states have abol-
ished the death penalty: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Vermont. See N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Death Row, U.S.A., August, 1987.
138. 107 S. Ct. at 1697-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1701.
140. Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
141. For a discussion of the majority's analysis, see supra notes 95-114 and
accompanying text.
142. For a discussion of the felony murder doctrine and the controversy
surrounding it, see supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
143. For a discussion of Enmund, see supra notes 45-67 and accompanying
text.
144. These states are discussed supra at note 62 and accompanying text.
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human life standard, has corrected a significant weakness in the Enmund
holding by imposing a less stringent mental state requirement for non-
triggermen who are more heavily involved in criminal acts.
14 5
It is difficult to discern what remains of Enmund since procedural
safeguards imposed by the Court within the past sixteen years have
made capital punishment a highly improbable penalty for juries to exact
in cases involving minor participant felons. 14 6 The holding in Tison,
however, allowing imposition of the death penalty on those who act
recklessly during the course of serious crimes which ultimately end in
death, is consistent with the Court's position that the death penalty
should be reserved for the most reprehensible criminals who cause the
most abhorrent damage to society. 14
7
IV. CONCLUSION
With its decision in Tison v. Arizona, the Supreme Court has estab-
lished "reckless disregard for human life" as the minimum culpable
mental state required to justify imposition of the death penalty on major
participant felony murderers who do not themselves kill or intend to kill.
In doing so, the Court has provided important clarification on its posi-
tion in the controversy surrounding the death penalty as imposed on
convicted felony murderers and has insured consistency in state sen-
tencing procedures while protecting defendants' rights by embracing
only the most culpable and dangerous of criminals.
James J. Holman
145. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1688.
146. For a discussion of the evolution of the Court's procedural safeguards,
see supra notes 16-57 and accompanying text.
147. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1688.
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